The majority of current anonymous systems focus on improving anonymity at the network and website level in order to defend against traffic analysis attacks. However, the vulnerability of the connections between end users and the anonymous network do not attract any attention yet. For the first time, we reveal an end user browsing dynamics based attack on anonymous browsing systems at the LAN where the victim locates. This new attack method is fundamentally different from existing attack methodologies. In general, web surfers browse the web following certain patterns, such as requesting a web page, viewing it and requesting another page. The browsing pattern of a victim can be clearly observed by a local adversary when the victim is viewing the web without protection. Unfortunately, browsing dynamics releases rich information for attacking even though the web page content is encrypted. In order to show how a local eavesdropper can decipher which pages have been viewed with the knowledge of user browsing dynamics and the public information of a given website, we established a specific hidden Markov model to represent browsing dynamics for the website. By using this model, we can then identify the optimal of the accessed pages using the Viterbi algorithm. In order to confirm the effectiveness of the revealed attack method, we have conducted extensive experiments on a real data set. The results demonstrated that the attack accuracy can be more than 80%. A few possible counter-attack strategies are discussed at the end of the paper.
INTRODUCTION
In this paper, we reveal a brand new attack strategy on anonymous web browsing systems. This strategy is fundamentally different from the traditional traffic analysis [1] [2] [3] or profiling attack mechanisms [4] because it employs end user browsing dynamics to break user's anonymity. Anonymous web browsing is becoming a killer application as more and more sensitive activities are performed via the web. Different from the traditional information eavesdropping on the message itself, the goal of anonymous attacks is to identify or confirm issues such as the web pages a monitored user has browsed, the website a monitored user has accessed or who is communicating with whom [5] .
Anonymous systems are a promising platform and attract extraordinary attention from researchers. For example, numerous attacks have been proposed and exercised in order to improve anonymous systems [6] [7] [8] [9] . In the literature, traffic analysis is a powerful attack tool against anonymity, and as a result, many of the available systems (such as tor [10] , crowds [11] or mix networks [12] ) focus on improving the anonymity of their anonymous networks or their websites against traffic analysis attacks. A large number of researchers try to improve the anonymity of the anonymous network, e.g. link padding [5, 13] . Another hot research in anonymous communication is to improve the anonymity at the server side, such as traffic morphing to hide the feature of intended pages [4] 2 S. Yu et al. and padding with predicted web pages to improve the performance [14] . However, to the best of our knowledge, the vulnerability of end user aspect (the connection between the end user and the anonymous network) has yet to be explored.
For the first time, we reveal in this paper an effective attack method on anonymous web browsing systems which takes advantage of user browsing dynamics rather than traditional attack strategies. The attack scenario we discuss is shown in Fig. 1 . Similar to other anonymous researches [7, 15] , we define our research under the following circumstances: an attacker (Bob) knows the monitored user (Alice) is accessing a website. Bob sets out to find the web pages Alice has accessed. In other words, he expects to confirm whether Alice has viewed a set of web pages. Moreover, this scenario can be extended further: Bob knows Alice accesses one website on a list, but wants to know which website she has accessed. These two scenarios are essentially the same except that the latter involves higher computing complexity. Therefore, we only discuss the first scenario in this paper.
In general, web browsers usually follow the request-viewrequest pattern when they surf the web. Therefore, as shown in Fig. 1 , Bob can easily obtain Alice's web requests in terms of time even though the request packets are encrypted. There are a number of requests for a page; however, the time interval for the requests (t r ) is at milliseconds level, and the viewing time (t v ) is usually at minutes level [16] . Therefore, t r will be ignored in the remainder of this paper. Moreover, for a given viewer, the period of time she reads a given page is proportional to the readable length of the content. The length in this situation is an abstract concept, but it does vary in different circumstances. For example, the length could be the total words in a page or the number of photos for a photo gallery page. As a result, the time intervals of a user's web page requests highly correlate with the length of the requested web pages. To summarize, this means although Bob cannot see the content of Alice's packets because they are encrypted, he can observe the time intervals of the requested pages. With this browsing dynamics information, FIGURE 1. Alice browses a website via an anonymous system; however, Bob can observe her web page requests in terms of time even though the connection is encrypted.
Bob can employ the side channel attack method [17, 18] to figure out the requested pages. Usually, the hidden Markov model (HMM) [19] is hired to achieve this goal. We name this kind of attack as a browsing dynamics based attack.
It is true that Alice may not follow the general browsing dynamics; however, a browsing dynamics based attack still works. Since Bob monitors the inbound and outbound traffic of Alice, he can learn Alice's specific browsing dynamics when she surfs the web without any anonymity protection. Bob then employs this knowledge in his attack when Alice browses the web through anonymous systems.
Moreover, this attack methodology could be practiced at different levels of the web: on the website level or the whole Internet level. In the case that Alice only accesses the pages of one website, if Bob is sure about which website that Alice is accessing (otherwise, he can probe the suspected websites one after another), then the information about the structure of the website is available to Bob; furthermore, Bob can conduct experiments to obtain the page-viewing time intervals, respectively. By unifying the page-viewing time intervals, he knows the relative 'length' of each pages of the website. He can also obtain the time interval sequence of Alice's page requests as an observable variable, which is caused by the unobservable page length, respectively. With all the information in hands, Bob can establish a HMM to identify the most passible web pages that Alice has viewed. In the second case, Alice accesses the pages of a number of websites. This is actually the same problem as the first case except for the scale of the problem. The attacker can employ the same methodology to break the anonymity by simply treating the suspected websites as a virtual one website. Therefore, we only discuss the first case in this paper in order to make our explanation to be understood smoothly.
The contributions of this paper are summarized as follows.
(i) For the first time, we revealed the vulnerability of user side of the current anonymous web browsing systems. The majority of researchers have ignored the vulnerability of the user side and have instead focused on fighting against traffic analysis on anonymous networks or website features. As a result, an eavesdropper can easily break the anonymity of browsing by using user browsing dynamics. (ii) We established a specific HMM for the proposed attack method. Different from the traditional HMM models, our proposed model includes the information of the link structure of a given website. We also created a null page in order to make transitions between any two pages possible. (iii) We demonstrated the effectiveness of the proposed new attack method through extensive experiments on a real data. Our experiments indicated that the attack accuracy can reach more than 80%. (iv) We proposed a few possible methods in order to counter the proposed attack method in this paper.
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The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Related work is discussed in Section 2, followed by the preliminary web dynamics in Section 3. In Section 4, we present the problem settings. The detail of modeling and how to exercise a browsing dynamics based attack is discussed in Section 5. The evaluation of the effectiveness of the proposed attack method is demonstrated in Section 6, and in Section 7, we discuss possible counter-attack methods. Finally, we conclude this paper and present future work in Section 8.
RELATED WORK
There are a number of systems in place that offers anonymous web browsing. Some systems simply offer proxy services to disguise user IP address from the accessed server. This means a user accesses the intended website through an anonymous proxy, and as a result, the web server can only record the IP address of the proxy server rather than the user's IP address [20, 21] . These systems are too simple to protect privacy against traffic analysis and profiling attacks. Fortunately, there are systems offering advanced anonymous services, such as tor [10], crowds [11] and mix networks [12] . These systems generally deploy public and private key techniques and a random dynamic multiple relay mechanism to offer a high level anonymous services. It is a challenge to achieve acceptable delay for anonymous web browsing systems. There are three pairs of encryption and decryption within the anonymous network on top of the encryption and decryption on the web content; the delay is huge for the existing anonymous web browsing systems. In our previous work [14] , we proposed to use predicted web pages to pad the intended pages, rather than padding with dummy packets. This strategy can reduce the delay and achieve the same level of anonymity as dummy packet padding. The proposed method works at the server side against traffic analysis attacks on the anonymous network.
Traffic analysis is a powerful way to attack against anonymous systems. Early work was done by Sun and his colleagues who tried to identify the sources of encrypted network traffic using the http object number and size. Their investigation showed that the employed method was sufficient to identify a significant fraction of websites of the Internet [22] . Following this direction, Wright et al. [23] further confirmed that websites can be identified with high probability even if it is an encrypted channel. Zhu et al. [6] employed the flow-correlation-based traffic analysis to attack mix-based lowlatency anonymity networks and they found that all but a few batching strategies fail against their attacks. Recently, there are plenty of report of traffic analysis attack on anonymity networks [7, 9] .
Researchers also explored profiling attacks and proposed counter-attack solutions. Coull et al. evaluated the strength of the anonymization method in terms of preventing the assembly of behavioral profiles. They concluded that anonymization offers less privacy to web browsing traffic than what was expected [24] . Liberatore and Levine used a profiling method to infer the sources of encrypted http connections. They applied packet length and direction as attributes, and established a profile database for individual encrypted network traffic. Based on this information, they inferred the source of individual encrypted network traffic [25] . There are some other types of attack methods, such as flow correlation attack [26] , the network congestion attack [8] . More literature can be found at [27] .
Side information is also an effective tool to break security and anonymity [17] . There are various types of side information, such as power consumption [28] , electromagnetic radiation [29] , timing [18, 30] and cache behavior [31] . Most of the researches focus on obtaining the encrypted message itself, such as password [18, 30] . Usually attackers collect the information generated by the device that performs the encryption or anonymization tasks to achieve the goals of attackers. Usually, the HMM [19, 32] is deployed to achieve the goal of attacking [18, 30, 33] . Song et al. demonstrated that time intervals of hitting the keys reveals sufficient information to infer the password by an adversary who monitors the SSL channel. For example, the hitting time interval for 'bo' is shorter than 'bv' because we type the former by two hands and the latter by one finger. Furthermore, one packet is generated and sent to the SSL channel once a key is pressed. Therefore, it is easy for attackers to figure out possible passwords. The authors employed the HMM to carry out the attack. Their experiments demonstrated that timing information can speedup an exhaustive search for a password by a factor of 50 [30] . Zhuang et al. carefully investigated the keyboard acoustic emanation issue. They tried to identify the password via the sound when the monitored user hits the keyboard. The underlying theory is that every key sounds differently for a given typist. Machine learning methods and the hidden Markov chain are employed to execute the attack. The experiments demonstrated that their attack method is quite accurate and efficient. For example, they can achieve 80% accuracy for a 10-character password in fewer than 75 attempts [18] . In this paper, we use side information differently from previous methods by employing side information and HMM techniques to attack anonymous web browsing systems.
Certain studies on browsing dynamics have revealed that 79% of users tend to scan web pages, while 16% read the web pages carefully [34]. Crovella et al. indicated that the distribution of the viewing times is Pareto, and the minimum view time is 30 s [16, 35] .
PRELIMINARY OF WEB DYNAMICS
It is well known that the popularity of web pages for a given website follow the Zipf-like distribution [36, 37] . Suppose there are N web pages in total, and they are sorted from the most to 4
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the least popularity as w 1 , w 2 , . . . , w N . Let p(w i ) be the access probability of the ith page, then
where α z is the Zipf index; it is a factor of skewness of the distribution. When α z = 1, then Equation (1) is the Zipf distribution. Since
The popularity distribution offers us the initial access probability of each web page of the website, which is used in our browsing dynamics based attack model later on in this paper.
The common recognition on the distribution of the size of a web document is that it follows the Pareto distribution. Some researches have indicated that the size distribution of a web document is composed of two distributions: a lognormal distribution for the body up to a transition point, and a Pareto distribution for the tail [16] . Reed and Jorgensen [38] revised this into one formula, and named it as double Pareto distribution. This finding was supported by Burklen et al. [35] . However, the difference between the double Pareto distribution and the Pareto distribution is at the section of tail part, with the majority of the two distributions being similar to each other. Therefore, in this paper, we use the Pareto distribution. Crovella and Bestavros [16] indicated that there is a direct connection between page size and its viewing time; they demonstrated that page-viewing time also follows the Pareto distribution. Therefore, in this paper we treat the distribution for page size and page-viewing time interchangeably.
Let X be a random variable, and x m be the minimum size or minimum viewing time for web pages. For a given web page with size or viewing time x, the probability density function of the Pareto distribution is defined as follows.
where x m ≤ x, and α p is the Pareto index. Both of the Zipf distribution and the Pareto distribution are a form of power law distribution, and the Zipf distribution and the Pareto distribution can be transformed to each other.
PROBLEM SETTINGS
We set up our problem as follows: an adversary (Bob) knows that the monitored user (Alice) is accessing a website via an anonymous system. This means the network packets are encrypted and Bob cannot read the content of the packets. However, Bob is able to monitor the inbound and outbound traffic from Alice's computer at a local gateway or router. Therefore, he is able to record Alice's http request sequence in terms of time.
The purpose of this paper is to show how Bob is able to identify which pages of a website Alice has browsed. Of course, we can expand the attack to identify which websites have been browsed by Alice from a list of websites. These two problems are essentially the same except for the complexity of computing. For the sake of simplicity, we only discuss the first scenario in this paper.
Many of the current researchers have focussed on the following attack and counter-attack scenarios: Bob expects to use traffic analysis methods to identify the web pages that Alice has browsed, and Alice tries her best to defeat Bob's attempts using packet padding and link padding. As mentioned in the introduction of this paper, most of the current research for anonymous web browsing has concentrated on anonymizing the traffic against traffic analysis attacks in the network and website aspects. However, in this paper, we argue that Bob can shift from traffic analysis to user browsing dynamics analysis to break the anonymity of Alice's web browsing.
For a given website, such as a medical website, a news website or a website with sensitive information, we assume that there are N(N ∈ I ) web pages, w 1 , w 2 , . . . , w N . We use |w i |(1 ≤ i ≤ N) to denote the length of the readable content of page w i . Alice uses anonymous systems to encrypt her inbound and outbound packets in order to protect her privacy.
Bob knows that Alice is accessing the website, and he has full knowledge of w 1 , w 2 , . . . , w N , as the website is also available to him. In addition to this, the hyperlink structure of the website is also available to Bob. In order to obtain other browsing dynamics, such as the viewing time for each page, and the initial access probability of web pages, Bob can observe the users who access the website without anonymous protection and even can perform the tests himself.
The requests for a web page are submitted in a very short time interval, say 10 ms (t r in Fig. 1 , which can be ignored), and the viewing time is usually quite longer than the request time interval, say 60 s. As a result, Alice's viewing activity is clearly observed by Bob in terms of viewing time intervals. Figure 2 further presents the actions from Alice and the related observations by Bob in detail.
In Fig. 2 Different users possess different reading speeds, and most reading speeds of various readers are also different, yet the reading speed for a given reader is usually consistent. In order to remove the impact of the reading speed, Bob can adjust his observation. Based on statistical large number theory, when the number of samples is sufficient, the mean of the samples is close enough to the real mean. Xie andYu [33] indicated that browsing length is usually around 30, and this is sufficient for statistical accuracy. Bob can obtain a reading factor, η, as follows.
where T is the number of observations of Bob. With the reading factor, he can adjust every observation as follows to fix the difference of reading speed among different viewers.
In the rest of the paper, we use o i to represent the corresponding adjusted observation item t i .
Moreover, Bob can identify Alice's reading speed by monitoring her browsing dynamics without anonymity protection on other websites. The learned knowledge is a better presentation of Alice's browsing dynamics.
Suppose, Alice browsed T pages of the given website, and viewing time intervals are {t 1 , t 2 
MODELING BROWSING DYNAMICS BASED ATTACK
In this section, we will demonstrate how Bob can determine the web pages Alice has browsed. In general, Bob needs to establish a HMM using his own experiments or observations on the browsing dynamics of the users who access the website without anonymity protection. By observing Alice's page request sequence information, Bob can obtain the optimal solution with the available algorithms that serve the HMM models. The goal of this paper is to reveal a new attack strategy on anonymous web browsing systems. Therefore, we make three reasonable assumptions to simplify our explanation. We have to point out that all three assumptions are on Alice's browsing behavior, and all of them can be removed in practice. The reason is that Bob can learn Alice's browsing dynamics when she surfs the web without anonymity protection.
(i) We suppose that Alice's repeated browsing pattern is requesting one page, viewing the page and requesting another page. In practice, a reader may have various page request habits, such as requesting a group of pages first and then read them one after another. This request habit can easily be obtained by observing the user when she surfs the web without anonymity protection. Once Bob obtains her request pattern, then a model can be accordingly established, and the assumed browsing pattern can be replaced. (ii) We suppose that Alice does not have any rest periods for the whole browsing session. This means she reads page after page without break. This assumption can also be replaced by a specific model by observing Alice's browsing behavior when she surfs the web without anonymity protection. (iii) We suppose that once Alice requested one page, she will read all the content of the page using a constant speed. Similar to previous two assumptions, this one can be replaced by a specific model in practice as well.
With these three assumptions, we know that an observed time interval is proportional to the readable length of the requested page.
Hidden Markov model for browsing dynamics based attack
The HMM has been explored for more than 30 years, and there are numerous papers focusing on it and its different features [19, 32] . The classical HMM is defined as
where A is the state transition matrix, B is the probability distribution of the observed symbols for a given state and π is the initial probability distribution of the states. In our model, we treat every web page as one unique state. Suppose the website has N web pages in total, we represent them as N states in the model, {s 1 , s 2 , . . . , s N }. We denote the state at time t as q t .
A user may start her browsing with any page of the website, and follow the hyperlinks of the current page to access other pages. At the same time, there is a possibility during the browsing that a user may key in a URL or choose a URL from her favorite list. This is a jump from page i to page j (j = i) where there is no hyperlink for page j in page i. In order to deal with this issue, we define a special page, null page (denoted as state s 0 in the state space). As a result, the jump from page i to page j can be interpreted as: page i transfers to the null page, and then the null page transfers to page j . In this way, the Let a ij represent the transition probability from state i to state j , namely,
Then the state transition matrix can be represented as
Following the definition, we know that N j =0 a ij = 1, and N i=0 a ij = 1. For a given page w i , if we perform some reading tests, we will have a probability distribution on viewing time. Let b i (k) be the the probability distribution of an observed value k(k ≥ 0) for a given state i, then it is defined as follows.
Then the second parameter of our model is defined as follows.
The parameter π i (0 ≤ i ≤ N) represents the probability of the initial state s i , namely
We know that π 0 = 0, N i=0 π i = 1, and π i (1 ≤ i ≤ N) follows the Zipf distribution. Following its definition in Equation (1), for the i th ranked page of the website, its related access probability is
The third parameter of the proposed model is defined as follows.
In order to achieve the goal of finding the accessed pages, Bob needs to further define a forward variable and a backward variable. The forward variable is defined as
The followings hold by the definition of the forward variable.
The backward variable is defined as
Similar to the forward variable, the following hold for the backward variable.
Estimating parameters of the model
The following definitions are expected to find the most possible parameters of the proposed HMM. The probability of being in state s i at time t is defined as
As the system has to be in one of the state for any given time t, therefore, N i=1 γ t (i) = 1. The sum of γ t (i) over time t is then the expectation of γ (i), namely
Given the model, the probability of being in state s i at time t, and being in state s j at time t + 1 is defined as
The Equation (19) can be expressed by the forward variable and the backward variable as follows.
The sum of ξ t (i, j ) over time t is the expectation of ξ(i, j ), namely,
The following iteration has been proved to archive a better parameter estimation for HMM models with more and more observations.
Let λ = (A, B, π) be the current HMM model, where
and π = {π i }(0 ≤ i ≤ N) are the current parameters. Once we have more observations, we can obtain the average as follows.
We useā ij to replace a ij ,b j (k) to replace b j (k), andπ i to replace π i , then we have a new representation of the model, λ = (Ā,B,π) . It has been proven that with more observation (larger T ), Pr[O|λ] > Pr[O|λ] [39, 40] . Therefore, once we have sufficient observations, we can obtain sufficient accuracy of the parameters of the HMM model.
With the model λ and the observation O = {o 1 , o 2 , . . . , o T } in hand, the task is to find the optimal sequence of Q = {q 1 , q 2 , . . . , q T } that is the best to generate O. Namely, it is time to answer the question in Equation (5 
Inferring browsed pages
Based on previous definitions and discussions, we can obtain the most likely state q t at time t individually as follows.
In other words, Equation (23) identifies the most possible state individually that generated O t based on α t and β t at time t.
However, the solution from Equation (23) may not reflect the real access sequences as it treats each state independently; therefore, the solution based on Equation (23) may not exist at all. The correlation of pages in an access sequence possesses strong connection in practice. For example, most viewers follow the hyperlinks of the current viewing page to explore further; this fact seriously threats the accuracy of the solution based on (23). If we take the hyperlink information into account, the accuracy will be improved. Therefore, a better solution is to look for the most possible sequence with the transition matrix A and initial probability π. The algorithms for finding optimal sequence are available from dynamic programming, and the most popular one is the Viterbi Algorithm [19] . The algorithm is presented as follows.
In order to measure the optimality of a sequence, a score variable δ t (i) is defined as
This is used to identify the single best path that starts from q 1 and reaches state s i at time t. Based on the Markov property, all the history is contained in the current state. When we move one step further to reach state s j , we can obtain the best score to state s j at time t + 1 as
where δ t (i) is the best result at time t, a ij is the transition probability from state s i to s j , and b j (O t+1 ) is the probability of state s j given observation O t+1 . With T observations, we obtain the optimal sequence as
The optimal sequence δ * T is based on the state transition matrix A, including possible jumps that are bridged by the null page. Therefore, the result from Equation (26) is more reliable than that from Equation (23).
Implementation of browsing dynamics based attack
In this section, we present the algorithm to execute the browsing dynamics based attack. As discussed in Section 5, we implement the attack with three assumptions even though these assumptions can be eliminated in practice. With these assumptions, we know there is only one observation value for any page, namely b i (k) ≡ 1 for any i. Therefore, we can omit the second parameter, B, from the proposed HMM model, which reduces the complexity of our implementation. The attack algorithm is presented in Fig. 3 .
The algorithm is based on two variables: the forward variable α t (i) and the backward variable β t (i). There are two major components that contribute to the computing complexity of the algorithm: the model parameter estimation (the while loop in Fig. 3 ) and the optimal sequence calculation (the second for loop in Fig. 3) . Both of them require the order of N 2 T operations, where N is the number of the total states and T is the number of observations. As a result, the computing complexity of the algorithm is on the order of N 2 T . For example, if we have 100 observations on page requests of a website with 1000 different pages, then the computing complexity of the attack algorithm is on the order of 10 8 operations.
Further discussion on the attack
Following previous discussion, we can break the anonymity of user's web browsing in theory. At the same time, an attacker can take further actions to improve the quality of his attacks by collecting further side information. The monitored user, Alice, may browse other websites without using an anonymous system. Bob therefore can observe her browsing behavior, such as reading speed and pattern of web page requesting. With this 8
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information, Bob can significantly improve his attack accuracy. The computation complexity is extraordinarily high when the total number of web pages, N , is sufficiently great. However, Bob can address this issue of complexity by only taking the N (N N) most popular page to conduct the inference.
EFFECTIVENESS EVALUATION ON BROWSING DYNAMICS BASED ATTACK
In order to evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed attack method, we have collected web browsing dynamics data for 1 week at a Chinese backbone network center. There are thousands of websites in the center, we took six popular websites from different categories for our experiments: sina and sohu (similar to CNN) for news , sinavideo (similar to Youtube) for video, baidu (similar to google) for search engine, taobao (similar to ebay) for e-business and huaxi for an online share market. Extensive experiments have been conducted based on the real data set, and our target is to evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed browsing dynamics based attack strategy.
Parameters of browsing dynamics
There are two distributions and four parameters in our experiments: the distribution of web page popularity (the Zipf distribution, the parameter is α z ), the distribution of viewing time (the Pareto distribution, the parameters are x m and α p ) and the measurement scale of the observed time intervals. Breslau et al. [36] indicated that these two distributions are independent of each other. Moreover, Crovella and Bestavros [16] showed that the Pareto distribution of page size resulted in a Pareto distribution of viewing time of the page; therefore, they are the same in terms of impact on the effectiveness of an attack. As previously discussed, we know that the number of requests for one page and the rank of the page follows the Zipf-like law [16, 36] . We examined this on our data set, and the results are shown as in Fig. 4 .
The numerical results of Zipf index α z of our data set are listed in Table 1 . Our results are quite close to [16] , but different from [36] , which indicates that α z varies around 0.4 to 0.8. In order to cover all possible values, we take α z at the range from 0.2 to 2.0 in our experiments.
The parameters of viewing time distribution and file size distribution of our data set is compatible with previous reports [16, 33, 35, 38] . As a result, we take the range of α p from 0.2 to 2.0, and the minimum viewing time x m as 30 s.
The experiment settings
For the experiments, we took the most popular 1000 pages from a real-text-based website (the pages with an average viewing time <30 s were discarded), and kept the hyperlinks the same as they were. We sorted the pages in terms of popularity, and kept the order in every experiment, but changed the value of For every instance of the given α z , α p and x m , we randomly chose a browsing path from the selected data set, and then we transferred the sequence of the pages into a sequence of time intervals, which was the observation of attackers. Using the observation as an input into our specific HMM, the output of the model is the inference of the viewed pages. We compared the output of the model with the corresponding path and obtained the attack accuracy, which is the percentage of the correct inference.
In order to make sure the experimental results converge to the real value, we repeated the same experiment 50 times for every given setting instance, and took the average as the final result.
The attack accuracy
We define attack accuracy as the percentage of correctness of the inference of the proposed browsing dynamics based attack strategy. The attack accuracy is a measurement of the effectiveness for the proposed attack method.
There are several possible factors that affect the attack accuracy of the proposed attack method, such as the time interval measure scale, the browsing length and the dynamics of the website (α z , α p and x m ). We will explore these factors in this section.
To begin with, the measurement scale of observation is a critical element for attack accuracy. We examined this factor by fixing the following parameters: α z = 1, α p = 1 and a browsing length of 30. We investigated the attack accuracy against the minimum viewing time, x m , with three different measuring scales: 1, 0.5 and 0.1 s. Intuitively, we know that the measuring scale has a significant impact on attack accuracy with finer granularity and higher attack accuracy.
The result of the experiments is shown in Fig. 5 . The experiments show that the attack accuracy can be as high as 75, 70 and 50% for the measurement scale of 0.1, 0.5 and 1 s respectively. We know that it is easy to achieve measure accuracy as 0.1 s using computers; therefore, it is easy to achieve an attack accuracy as high as 75%. In the following experiments, we took the observation measure scale as 0.1 s as the default value if it is not specified explicitly.
We further examined the relationship between attack accuracy and the length of browsing under different measurement scales. Xie and Yu [33] showed that the browsing length has a wide range, but the majority of them fall between 1 and 60. We used this range in our experiments, and the result is shown in Fig. 6 . We found that attack accuracy tended to drop with an increase in browsing length; however, the drop is minimal. In other words, browsing length does not have an obvious impact on attack accuracy. Moreover, the accuracy of attacks is becoming more stable with longer browsing length.
We also examined the impact on attack accuracy from the minimum viewing time. In this experiment, we measured attack accuracy by increasing the minimum viewing time from 30 to In order to discovery the accuracy of attacks from the various distribution of viewing times (which is directly related to the distribution of page size), we altered the Pareto index of viewing time (α p ) from 0.2 to 2.0, and measured the attack accuracy respectively. In order to show the impact of the Zipf index on the result, we duplicated the experiments with three different 10 S. Yu et al. Zipf index values: 1.5, 1.0 and 0.5. The results are presented in Figure 8 .
From Fig. 8 , we observed that increasing the Pareto index generally increases our attack accuracy, and at the same time, a higher Zipf index results in higher accuracy of attacks. However, the impact on attack accuracy from the Zipf index decreases when the Zipf index gets closer to 2.0.
We also examined the impact on attack accuracy from the distribution of the popularity of web pages, the Zipf index α z . clusters with the help of dummy packet padding. Once a page is requested, the related group of pages will be downloaded to the client. Attacker may be able to identify the group, but he can only know that the intended page is one of the n pages. When n is sufficient, the protection of anonymity is quite high.
We are currently witnessing more and more wireless-based web browsing tools, such as iPad, smart phone. The wireless channels are more vulnerable to attacks. There are also works on anonymization for wireless channels [42, 43] . These works are also focused on the anonymous network part, and the connection between users and the anonymous network is still vulnerable to our proposed attack method. Although the browsing behavior will be different, but this change has no impact on proposed attack strategy and attack accuracy.
Peer-to-peer applications are dominating the Internet traffic, and the uploading and downloading actions possess rich information about the transported content. It is of high probability that hackers may be able to break users' privacy when they download files from a server using peer-to-peer applications. As different parts of the intended file come from different sources, which is different from web browsing. It is still possible to apply the user-browsing-behavior-based attack strategy to break privacy protection, however, it needs extra effort, for example, new user behavior modeling and inferring algorithms in a multiple sources circumstance.
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we have revealed the vulnerability of the end user side for current anonymous web browsing systems, which has been ignored by the network anonymity community for a long period of time. We discovered that it is very easy for eavesdroppers to obtain the time interval sequence of a monitored user even when the victim accesses websites via an existing anonymous network. This time interval sequence is sufficient for attackers to infer which pages have been viewed by employing the available HMM techniques. Our real dataset-based experiments indicated that the attack accuracy can be more than 80%. In other words, the proposed attack is quite effective.
As future work, there are a few interesting directions for further exploration. First of all, counter-attack strategies need to be explored and tested to protect browsing anonymity of web viewers. Although link padding and request padding are promising solutions; however, the cost has to be reduced to meet the delay tolerance of web browsing. Secondly, one of our experiments indicated that the attack accuracy decreases slightly when the browsing length increases. This may be worthwhile to explore further to find out the reasons. Thirdly, the Hidden semi-Markov Model is an extension of the HMM with explicit state duration, it could model web browsing behavior better, and therefore improve the attack accuracy.
